

IC Registry

Deputy Director For Requirements and Evaluation
Intelligence Community Staff

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NOTE FOR:
Executive Director, CIA


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1. When we had lunch yesterday, I promised to send you a copy of a short paper done by He attended the week-long seminar at Harvard a few days ago. I think you will find the material of interest.


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2. I will get back to you about your paper early next week.

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Attachment:



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10 November 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Harvard's Intelligence Assessment and Policy Program

1. For the week of 1-7 November, some 30 intelligence professionals --mostly from DI--grabbled with the issue of how to make finished intelligence relevant in the policymaking process. Although the Harvard's Kennedy School of Government ran the program, gave the lectures, and oversaw the exercises, it was the students who addressed the issues.

2. I learned the following from those student discussions:

- o Policymakers mind-sets: All have them, but some are more strongly held than others. Political appointees and those of strong ideological bent rarely let the views of others, including intelligence analysts, get in the way of carrying out policy. When we looked at several important decisions on policy made in the past, none were markedly affected by the Intelligence Community.
- o Intelligence can be a major help in rightly defining the problem, but it is not looked to in the higher councils when the likes of SecDef and SecState are debating on the best option. Usually, policymakers involved in major policy decisions do not spend much time on understanding the nature of the problem being faced, rather they tend to move directly to finding a solution.
- o Dealing with mind-sets: There are no easy ways to effectively deal with mind-sets, but by establishing one's credibility (normally requiring continuing personal contact) and being a little pushy, intelligence analysts can make an impact during the decisionmaking period. Several lecturers indicated that when they were in "policymaking jobs" they were not approached by intelligence analysts with an offer of assistance.
- o Timing also is critical, not only in having analysis available when a major decision is pending, but just as important, during the stages before bureaucratic entities start taking positions.
- o One way to improve the prospects of intelligence becoming a meaningful part of the process is to ensure that the newly arriving policymakers understand what a great asset they have in the

SUBJECT: Harvard's Intelligence Assessment and Policy Program

Intelligence Community and what they ought to expect from that asset. In turn, the Community needs to do a better job of informing new policymakers about intelligence as a process and a bureaucratic domain as well as a product.

- o Marketing the Product: Although much of the discussion centered on presentation (art form), there were concerns expressed about altering the substance when the presentation is modified. In any event, what has been missing in much of the work force has been a sense of entrepreneurship, possibly essential to the successful marketing of a product that might not be sought by the consumer.
- o Practical solutions offered included establishing a marketing staff (we have a legislative staff why not an executive government staff?), distributing the names and phone numbers of analysts associated with a particular subject to policymakers, holding analyst-policymaker beer-bust, and developing techniques aimed at getting to know the policymaker better. If the Intelligence Community is going to operate in the market place as a business, then it must have an effective market research effort.
- o Role of the analysts: Can analysts continue to analyze and market products without analysis suffering? The old problem of relevancy versus completeness and objectivity cannot be easily dismissed. Moreover, trying to "tell policymakers what they need to know, not what they want to know" can create an image of non-team playing, arrogant know-it-all. Yet, analysts must strive for objectivity and relevancy at the same time if they ever hope to become major players.
- o Institutional bias: Physical and psychological separations of intelligence analysts and policymakers are realities that some see value in maintaining--as one professor put it; it is rough on the policy side, and you could easily get bloodied. The ivory tower approach to intelligence analysis, however, augers for irrelevance in major policy decisions. As Henry Kissinger allegedly stated, "yes, you [intelligence] told me that the policy would not work, but you did not convince me." So it would appear intelligence must do more than inform, it must convince the policymaker of the value of the information or judgment it offers.
- o We need to overcome our dependence on the written word, and stop believing that writing things down ends our obligation to inform. When, we do write, we must do so with particular policymakers in mind

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and try to understand the assumptions that are underlying their positions or attitudes or beliefs, etc. In the final analysis, no matter what we do to improve the quality and appearance of our product, the policymaker will have the final say on its value.



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